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Abstract
We introduce a method based on the Public Goods Game for solving optimization tasks. In
particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem, i.e. a NP-hard problem whose search
space exponentially grows increasing the number of cities. The proposed method considers a popu-
lation whose agents are provided with a random solution to the given problem. In doing so, agents
interact by playing the Public Goods Game using the fitness of their solution as currency of the
game. Notably, agents with better solutions provide higher contributions, while those with lower
ones tend to imitate the solution of richer agents for increasing their fitness. Numerical simulations
show that the proposed method allows to compute exact solutions, and suboptimal ones, in the
considered search spaces. As result, beyond to propose a new heuristic for combinatorial optimiza-
tion problems, our work aims to highlight the potentiality of evolutionary game theory beyond its
current horizons.
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Nowadays, evolutionary game theory [1–6] represents a field of growing interest in different
scientific communities, as biology [7, 8] and social science [9]. Notably, identifying strategies
and methods for triggering cooperative behaviors [10], modeling biological phenomena [11]
and studying the effects of social influences [9, 12, 13] constitute some of the major aims in
this field. On the other hand, the Darwinian concept of evolution, underlying the dynamics
of evolutionary games, represents a powerful and inspiring source also in the field of natural
computing [14]. In the last years, many evolutionary algorithms [15, 16] have been proposed
for solving optimization problems [17–19], as for instance genetic algorithms [15] and ant
colony heuristics [20]. Remarkably, optimization problems have been widely investigated
also within the realm of statistical physics [21–28], where theoretical physics and information
theory meet forming a powerful framework for studying complex systems [29, 30]. For
instance, a statistical physics mindset in combinatorial optimization problems emerges when
the set of feasible solutions, of problems like the Traveling Salesman Problem [31, 32] (TSP
hereinafter), is represented in terms of an energy landscape. In doing so, the searching of
a solution corresponds to the searching of a minimum of free energy, in a landscape whose
global minimum, i.e. the deepest valley, corresponds to the optimal solution of the problem.
Different models as the Curie-Weiss [33] and spin glasses [34, 35] have an energy that can be
studied by the Landau formulation of phase transitions [36]. These models are successfully
adopted for facing different issues as opinion dynamics [37], information retrieval [25, 38, 39],
optimization tasks [21, 40] and learning processes [25]. Using the metaphor of the energy,
heuristics like genetic algorithms [15] and swarm logics [20], implement strategies as genetic
recombination, mutation, and collective motion, for surfing the energy landscape with the
aim to reach one of the more deep valleys in few time, i.e. one of the suboptimal solutions of
a problem. Therefore, parameters as the mutation rate, used in genetic algorithms, can be
compared to physical parameters, e.g. the temperature of a system. In this work, we adopt
a mechanism based on the partial imitation [40]: when an agent interacts with another one
having a higher fitness, the former imitates a part of the latter’s solution. For example, in
the TSP, the weaker agent imitates only a part of the path traveled by a stronger opponent.
In doing so, agents are able to generate solutions over time, with the aim to achieve the
optimal one. In physical terms, a partial imitation can be interpreted as a slow cooling
process of a spin particle system, where the slowness comes from an imitative dynamics
that is only ‘partial’ (i.e. only few entries of a solution array are imitated). Our model
2
considers an agent population, whose interactions are based on the Public Goods Game
(PGG hereinafter). As we know from evolutionary game theory (EGT hereinafter) [41], the
outcomes of the classical PGG are affected by a parameter defined synergy factor r, used for
supporting cooperators. Here, as shown below, this parameter (i.e. r) has a marginal role,
however what is relevant for our investigations is that an ordered phase (i.e. the prevalence
of a species in the population) can be reached by an opportune tuning of its value. Usually,
in EGT models, a species indicates a set of agents with the same strategy, e.g. cooperation,
whereas in the proposed model a species corresponds to a set of agents having the same
solution of a problem. In general, ordered phases entail all agents have the same state (or
strategy in EGT), i.e. in physical terms all spins are aligned in the same direction. Here, the
magnetization is a useful parameter that allows to measure the state of order of a system
and, in the ordered case, it has a value equal to ±1. Dealing with neural networks, and in
general with spin glasses, it is possible to introduce a gauge for the magnetization so that
its value goes to ±1 when the spin alignment (i.e. agent states) follows a particular pattern.
For instance, in the case of the TSP, a pattern can be a specific sequence of cities. The
mentioned gauge is defined Mattis magnetization [25], and it reads Mm =
1
n
∑
i isi with i
value in the i-th position of the pattern, si value of the spin in the same position of a signal
S of length n. As we can observe, when spins are perfectly aligned with a pattern , the
Mattis magnetization is equal to 1. In the proposed model, we introduce a similar approach.
In particular, each agent is provided with a random solution of the TSP (i.e. an array of
cities representing a possible solution), and the order is reached when all agents hold the
same solution. Therefore, in our case, the value of Mm is computed assigning the value of +1
when a city has the same position both in the pattern of reference (i.e. the known optimal
solution of a TSP problem), and in the solution array computed by an agent, otherwise the
value is −1. It is worth to recall that the utilization of the Mattis magnetization, as measure
for the performance of our model, can be adopted only when the optimal solution is known
in advance. Since our agents interact by the PGG, the modification of their solution occurs
during the phase of the game usually defined as ‘strategy revision phase’ [5], that in our case
is renamed as ‘solution revision phase’. Furthermore, our agents use their fitness as currency
of the game, so that their payoff depends on the quality of their solution and on those of
their opponents. We performed several numerical simulations to evaluate the quality of our
method considering the TSP as reference, i.e. a famous NP-hard problem. Results show
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that the PGG can be successfully adopted for developing new heuristics, opening the way
to investigations that cross the current fences of EGT.
I. MODEL
Before introducing the proposed model, let us recall the basic dynamics of the PGG. The
latter considers a population with N agents and two possible strategies: cooperation and
defection. Cooperators contribute to a common pool with a coin, while defectors contribute
nothing or, as in our case, provide a partial contribution (i.e. a coin whose value is lower
than that of coins provided by cooperators). Then, the total amount of coins is enhanced by
a synergy factor r (whose value is greater than 1), and the resulting value is equally divided
among all agents (no matter their strategy). In doing so, each agent receives a payoff which
reads pi
c = r
∑Nc
i=1 ci
G
− c
pid = r
∑Nc
i=1 ci
G
(1)
with N c number of cooperators, G amount of agents involved in the game (i.e. size of groups
considered at each iteration that, usually, is much smaller than N), ci unitary contribution
(we can set, without loss of generality, equal for all agents, i.e. ci = c = 1), and pi
c and
pid payoff of cooperators and defectors, respectively. As the quantitative definition of the
payoff suggests, defection is more convenient than cooperation, and it also represents the
Nash equilibrium of this game. The role of the synergy factor r is promoting cooperation
and, as demonstrated in previous investigations, its value may strongly affect the evolution
of a population [41]. Remarkably, in square lattices, values of r smaller than 3.75 entail
all agents become defectors, whereas higher values allow cooperators to survive and even to
succeed (for r ≥ 5.49). As previously mentioned, the evolution of a population results from
the process defined ‘strategy revision phase’. Notably, after each iteration, an agent has the
opportunity to change its strategy by imitating that of a richer opponent. Here, the richness
is related to the gained payoff. In the proposed model we consider a well-mixed population,
so that agents may freely interact with their opponents. Moreover, agents are provided with
a random solution of a TSP (i.e. an array of cities). Notably, each solution is evaluated by
a fitness η computed as follows
η =
Z − 1
D
(2)
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with Z number of cities, and D total distance of a path. In doing so, the fitness has a range
η ∈ [0, 1]. At each time step, one agent is randomly selected (say the xth) and plays the
PGG with 4 (randomly chosen) opponents, forming a group with G = 5 agents. Now, every
agent of the group contributes with its fitness; then, as in the PGG, the total summation
of contributions is enhanced by a synergy factor r and, finally, equally distributed among
all agents of the group. It is worth noting that, in the proposed model, all agents always
contribute. However, some agents provide a contribution higher/smaller than that of others.
Therefore, ’below average contributors’ (i.e. those having a low quality solution) can be
considered as defectors [42]. According to this setting, the payoff reduces to one equation
pix = r
∑5
i=1 ηi
G
− ηx (3)
with pix indicating the payoff of the xth agent, and ηx its fitness (i.e. that corresponding
to its solution). Finally, the ‘strategy revision phase’, in our model, is renamed ‘solution
revision phase’: the randomly selected agent computes the probability Πs to modify each
entry of its solution by imitating that of its best opponent (if exists)
Πs =
1
1 + e
ηx−pix
K
(4)
As in the PGG, K represents the uncertainty in imitating an opponent (i.e. plays the role of
temperature). Hence, setting K = 0.5 we implement a rational approach during the revision
phase [41]. Therefore, the xth agent imitates with probability Πs each entry of the solution
of its best opponent, if the latter has a greater or, at least, an equal fitness (otherwise the xth
agent does not revise its solution). Summarizing, given a TSP, we define a population whose
agents at the beginning receive a random solution of the problem. Then, local interactions,
based on the PGG, allow the population to converge towards a shared solution. From a
local point of view, at each time step, a randomly selected agent (say x) plays the PGG with
4 (randomly chosen) opponents, and computes its payoff (i.e. by Eq.( 3)). So, according
to its fitness ηx and to the gained payoff pix, the xth agent computes the probability Πs to
imitate the solution of its best opponent (say y, if exists). In particular, if ηy ≥ ηx, the xth
agent revises its solution, i.e. it imitates each entry of the solution of the yth agent with
probability Πs (i.e. each entry is modified according to Πs). The whole process is repeated
until the population reaches an ordered phase (i.e. all agent share the same solution), or up
to a limited number of time steps elapsed. It is worth observing that as Πs goes to 1, the
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imitation process entails one agent tends to copy the whole solution of its best opponent.
In addition, we remark that when an agent performs a ’partial imitation’, for instance to
modify one city along its path, the same city cannot be visited twice (i.e. it can be present
in only one cell of the solution array). In order to clarify this point we provide a simple
example. Let us consider an agent having the following solution: [ Paris, New York, London,
Miami, Rome, Madrid ], that has to put in the third cell (now containing London) the
city of Rome. Since currently Rome is in the fifth cell, the algorithm swaps the values for
the third and fifth cells so that, after the whole process, the resulting array is: [ Paris,
New York, Rome, Miami, London, Madrid ]. Thus, repetitions are completely avoided, and
all solutions generated according to the proposed heuristic are suitable solutions. Finally,
we deem relevant to emphasize the main differences between the PGG and the proposed
model. First, in our model, the contributions provided by the agents correspond to their
fitness, while in the PGG contributions just represent forms of cooperation to a common
wealth. Second, the ’strategy revision phase’ of the PGG, here renamed ’solution revision
phase’, entails an imitation process between two agents that can be complete or only partial.
Moreover, the imitation probability (i.e. 4) takes as input the payoff and the fitness of the
same agent, i.e. the one that undergoes the revision process. Finally, a further important
difference, between the PGG and the proposed model, is given by the number of possible
ordered equilibria. Notably, in the PGG, the possible ordered phases can correspond to full
cooperation, or full defection. Instead, in the proposed model, each suitable solution of a
combinatorial optimization problem can be an ordered equilibrium that the population can
reach.
II. RESULTS
Numerical simulations have been performed considering a number of cities up to Z = 50
for defining the TSP. Agents know the starting city and the landing one so, since each city
can be visited only once, the number of feasible solutions is (Z− 2)!. Moreover, without loss
of generality, we consider that the distance between two close cities is always equal to one
—see Fig. 1. Eventually, we set the synergy factor to r = 2. We remind that in the present
work we are not interested in studying phenomena as the evolution of cooperation, but we
aim to evaluate if agents are able to converge towards an ordered phase, characterized by the
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FIG. 1. General setting of the TSP considering Z = 6 cities forming a complete graph. Each node
represents a city, and some distances are reported in blue, close to the related link. Then, the best
solution is shown. Green nodes represent the starting and the landing ones.
existence of only one shared solution of a problem. Thus, the choice of setting r = 2 reflects
this requirement, i.e. to use a value that in the PGG leads to an ordered phase (i.e. full
defection in the specific case). As illustrated in Fig. 2, the ergodicity of the process always
allows agents to converge to one common solution. Moreover, we are able to verify the quality
of solutions both considering the related fitness and the Mattis magnetization (see the inset
of Fig. 2). In particular, the latter can be used when the solution of a problem is known in
advance (as in our case). An important relation to be considered is the one defined between
FIG. 2. Number of solutions over time in a population of N = 900 agents while solving a TSP with
10 cities (blue dotted line) and 20 cities (red line). The inset shows the related Mattis magnetization
for the two cases (both successful). Results have been averaged over 100 different attempts.
the final average fitness and the size of the population N , studied on varying the amount of
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cities Z —see plot a of Fig. 3. Moreover, as shown in plot b of Fig. 3, it is worth noting that
FIG. 3. a) Average fitness of the final solution in function of N (i.e. the number of agents), for
different values of Z (i.e. the number of cities). b) Average fitness of the final solution on varying
the number of cities, for different agents N . Results have been averaged over 100 different attempts.
also good suboptimal solutions may be computed using a number of agents N smaller than
that required to compute the optimal one. As expected, increasing Z the average value of
η reduces (keeping fixed the number of agents N). On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 4,
it is worth highlighting that it is possible to find an opportune N for each considered Z in
order to achieve the highest fitness (i.e. η = 1). We deem relevant to note that the number
of agents to compute the best solution, i.e. N(η = 1), is much smaller than the number of
feasible solutions for each problem, therefore our method can be considered a viable heuristic
for facing combinatorial optimization problems. Eventually, we focused on the number of
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FIG. 4. Minimum number of agents to compute the optimal solution of a TSP on varying the
number of cities Z. Results have been averaged over 100 different attempts.
time steps to let the population converge, considering in particular the successful cases, i.e.
those leading to the optimal solution —see Fig. 5. As expected, wide search spaces (e.g.
Z = 50) require more time steps to let the population converge to the same final (and
optimal) solution. Furthermore, increasing N and keeping fixed Z, the number of time steps
T increases accordingly. These results are in full agreement with converging processes that
can be observed in generic agent-based models, e.g. increasing the size of a population the
number of time steps, required to let agents converge towards the same state, increases [43].
FIG. 5. Number time steps required for converging to the final (optimal) state on varying Z, for
different population sizes N . Results have been averaged over 100 different attempts.
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III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work we show that evolutionary games as the PGG can be, in principle, applied
also for solving combinatorial optimization problems. In particular, the order-disorder phase
transition occurring in a population interacting by the PGG can be adopted for letting the
population converge towards a common solution of a problem. Notably, a solution plays the
same role of a strategy in the classical PGG, and the order is reached by implementing a
mechanism of ‘partial imitation’ [40]. The latter allows agents with a weak solution to par-
tially imitate stronger (i.e. richer) opponents. From a physical perspective, this mechanism
can be viewed as a slow cooling process that triggers the emergence of solutions over time,
whereas the ergodicity of the process allows the population to reach an absorbing state of
full order. In doing so, an ordered phase entails all agents share the same solution. Under
the hypothesis that an evolutionary dynamics driven by the payoff, i.e. rational, may con-
stitute the base for solving difficult problems as the TSP, we performed several numerical
simulations by considering a well-mixed population. Although we implemented a simplified
version of the TSP, with a limited number of cities, it is worth highlighting that results
indicate that the proposed model allows to compute the optimal solution in all considered
search spaces. Moreover, even using a reduced number of agents, it is possible to compute a
good suboptimal solution. Furthermore, we note that even introducing spatial constraints in
the TSP (e.g. a missing link between two cities), the algorithm is able to face the problem,
once the driveability of the graph is known (as shown in Fig. 1). Therefore, in the light
of the achieved outcomes, we deem relevant to further investigate the potential of evolu-
tionary games in optimization problems, then enlarging the domain of applications of EGT.
However, it is important to emphasize that in order to really appreciate the quality of the
proposed model as algorithm for solving the TSP, further investigations are required. In par-
ticular, those for comparing the performances with other heuristics, as genetic algorithms
(see Appendix I). On the other hand, we remark that our results indicate a clear relation
between the size of a population and the complexity of the faced problem. This last obser-
vation constitutes a first, even if theoretical, advantage of our method respect to the others
because, as far as we know, similar relations are not available for other methods. Now, from
the point of view of EGT, there are two important observations. First, the synergy factor
has a marginal role in the proposed model. We recall that, for the aims of our work, we
10
are interested in allowing the population to converge towards an ordered state. On studying
the PGG, the synergy factor is fundamental because, as before mentioned, some values may
lead a population towards a steady-state of coexistence between cooperators and defectors.
Therefore, since here we have to avoid similar scenarios, in principle, every value of the syn-
ergy factor that supports a generic state of full order can be adopted. At the same time, we
think that the synergy factor should not be too high, otherwise it might generate problems
when computing transition probabilities during the ’solution revision phase’. In particular,
as indicated in Eq.( 4), the fitness and the payoff are compared when evaluating whether
one agent has to change its strategy. Thus, we suggest to use small values, like the one we
adopted (i.e. r = 2). The second observation is related to the identification of defectors.
Notably, here we refer to the PGG, i.e. a simple game with two strategies: cooperation and
defection. In the classical version, cooperators contribute with a coin, while defectors do not
contribute. However, as reported in [42], when the amount of contributions is not set to a
specific value (e.g. a coin of unitary value), those agents that contribute with a below-average
contribution can be considered as defectors. To conclude, the proposed heuristic shows that
cooperative dynamics, leading from disordered to ordered states, may constitute the basic
mechanism for implementing optimization algorithms.
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APPENDIX I
Here, we report results of a comparative analysis between the proposed method and two
other heuristics: genetic algorithms [16] and social imitation [40]. The former constitutes
one of the most famous methods adopted in combinatorial optimization problems, while the
second allows to evaluate the differences between the proposed strategy and one based on a
simple imitative mechanism (based on the fitness). Before to show a comparative table, we
briefly summarize how the social imitation strategy works, and how the genetic algorithm has
been implemented. Let us start with the social imitation algorithm, implemented according
to the following steps:
1. Define a population with N agents, and assign each one a random solution for the
considered TSP;
2. Compute the fitness η of each agent (i.e. the goodness of its solution);
3. Compute the number of different solutions (say K) in the population;
4. IF K > 1:
(i) randomly select two agents (x and y) having different solutions:
IF ηx ≤ ηy perform a Solution Revision Phase (see below);
ELSE REPEAT from (i).
(ii) REPEAT from (3);
ELSE STOP.
The Solution Revision Phase is composed of the following steps
a Randomly select a position, say z, (i.e. an entry in the solution array) of the x-th agent’s
solution;
b Check that the value in z be different between the two selected agents, otherwise repeat
from (a);
c Compute the position, say w, in the x-th agent’s solution containing the value in position
z of the y-th agent’s solution;
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d Exchange in the x-th agent’s solution the values contained in positions z and w.
Genetic Algorithms can be implemented in several ways. In this work, we consider a
simple definition:
1. Define a population with N genes, assign each one a random solution for the considered
TSP, and define a maximum number of iterations I;
2. While the best fitness in the population is smaller than 1, or the number of iterations
is smaller than I:
3. Compute the fitness η of each gene (i.e. the goodness of its solution);
4. Select the best half of the population according to fitness;
5. Generate two new solutions for each couple of genes, defined among the set computed
at the previous step;
6. Apply the random mutation, to each gene, with probability pm;
We set to 0.1 the probability pm (i.e. the random mutation), and to 30k the maximum
number of iterations I. In addition, we emphasize that the crossover operator has been
defined by cutting each gene parent (i.e. solution) in two different points, so generating an
offspring by using the central part of one parent and the side parts of the other parent. In
the case this process generates not viable solutions (e.g. in the presence of repetitions), the
duplicates are removed for adding the missing cities. Table I shows the number of agents (or
genes for the genetic algorithm) for computing the optimal solution on varying the number
of cities, the average number of time steps required to complete a simulation and, when
smaller than 1, the average fitness.
According to these results, we observe that the proposed method requires the highest
number of agents to solve a TSP. However, if compared to the SI algorithm, our approach
is much more faster (see the average number of time steps < T >) than SI. Therefore, this
result seems to suggest that combining the ’game mechanism’ in an imitation process makes
sense for solving optimization problems. The genetic algorithm is the one that required
the smallest number of agents, and the smallest amount of time to complete a simulation.
At the same time, it is important to observe that the genetic algorithm has a synchronous
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TABLE I. Performance comparison on varying the number of cities (Z): proposed method (PGG),
Social Imitation (SI), and Genetic Algorithm (GA). N indicates the minimum number of agents
(genes for GA) used to solve the problem, and < T > indicates the average number of time steps
required. The average fitness < η > is indicated only when smaller than 1, although the best value
computed considering all attempts is 1 (i.e. the optimal solution has not been always computed).
Z PGG SI GA
10 N = 100 | < T >= 1K N = 60 | < T >= 8K N = 100 | < T >= 27
15 N = 900 | < T >= 17K N = 100 | < T >= 40K N = 100 | < T >= 200
20 N = 900 | < T >= 29K N = 270 | < T >=
500K
N = 100 | < T >= 1.3k
25 N = 4900 | < T >=
277K
N = 500 | < T >=
1.5M
N = 100 | < T >= 4.1k
30 N = 4900 | < T >=
500K
N = 700 | < T >=
5.5M
N = 100 | < T >=
13.2k
35 N = 4900 | < T >=
820K
N = 1000 | < T >=
15.5M
N = 100 | < T >=
17.5k
40 N = 10000 | < T >=
3M
N = 1200 | < T >=
40M
N = 200 | < T >= 23k
| < η >= 0.76
50 N = 22500 | < T >=
21M
N = 1600 | < T >=
360M
N = 200 | < T >=
28.5k | < η >= 0.61
dynamics (while our method and SI are asynchronous), i.e. during the same time step, all
agents are involved for generating offsprings and updating their solution (according to the
random mutation mechanism). Therefore, further analyses are required for a complete time
comparison. However, it seems that the genetic algorithm is the fastest one. Nevertheless we
found that, considering 20 different simulation runs, the average fitness of the best solution
(found in the gene population) is smaller than 1 when Z ≥ 40. Hence, the genetic algorithm
must be run several time for each task, saving the best solution. To conclude, according to
this analysis, we report that a genetic algorithm constitutes the best choice for solving simple
problems (i.e. with few cities), or for computing in few time a good suboptimal solution with
many cities. On the other hand, when the number of cities increases, the proposed method
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allows to reach a higher fitness in a number of attempts smaller than that required by a
genetic algorithm, and to compute the optimal solution within a number of time steps much
more smaller than that required by the social imitation strategy.
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